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Using a sample of cash tender offers occurring between 1993 and 2002, we find evidence 
that the options market has become the preferred venue for traders attempting to profit on 
anticipated announcements.  Options offer advantages relative to stocks.  Traders gain 
leverage by trading in options and multiple options contracts on an individual stock.  The 
results of our study indicate that a substitution effect does exist.  Abnormal volume in the 
option market replaces abnormal volume in the stock market prior to cash tender offer 
announcements, and this abnormal option volume precedes abnormal stock volume for 
targets with or without traded options. 
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 Do option markets substitute for stock markets?  Evidence from 
trading on anticipated tender offer announcements 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Prior empirical studies have documented significant volume and price increases in 
the stocks of tender offer targets prior to the first public announcement of an offer.  Our 
study examines whether the availability of options affects the demand for stock in these 
scenarios.  More specifically, we test for a substitution effect in which options are 
purchased in lieu of the underlying stock.  A number of reasons exist that might lead to 
this substitution effect.   
A call option is a limited-life security with value derived from the price of an 
underlying stock and provides a larger potential return than investing in the underlying 
stocks.  We test for such a substitution effect in this paper and find that the options 
market has indeed become the preferred venue for trading.  For those targets with traded 
options, we find that the abnormal stock volume that exists for targets without traded 
options is replaced by abnormal options volume and that the abnormal option volume 
begins earlier (13 days prior to announcement) when compared to abnormal stock market 
volume for the case of options not being available (10 days prior to announcement). 
Given the higher expected payoff to trading in options contracts, this finding of a 
substitution effect is not surprising as it validates prior empirical studies documenting 
abnormal levels of volume and implied volatility in the options of takeover targets 
preceding takeover announcements.  Specifically, our results indicate that the average 
return on the call options of tender offer targets is over 12 times that of the return on 
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common stocks (417% vs. 34%) and the median return is over 6 times that of stocks 
(191% vs. 31%) over the tender offer event period. 
The remainder of our study is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the existing 
relevant literature, Section 3 describes our sample and methodology, Section 4 presents 
our empirical tests for a substitution effect of trading in options markets rather than stock 
markets, Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.     Prior research 
Many studies have been conducted to test the informational efficiency of capital 
markets surrounding the event of a corporate takeover.  Early research tends to support 
semistrong-form market efficiency, favoring the idea that significant abnormal returns 
preceding corporate acquisitions are associated with insider trading.  Research by 
Mandelker (1974), Halpern (1976), and Keown and Pinkerton (1981) produce evidence of 
significant positive movements in target firm stock prices prior to a formal acquisition 
announcement.  Using monthly data, both Mandelker and Halpern find a preponderance 
of positive price movements on the order of 58% beginning one month prior to the 
takeover announcement and this percentage increases to 62% in the month of the 
announcement.  Refining these empirical findings with daily data, Keown and Pinkerton 
find that statistically significant positive abnormal returns begin 12 days in advance of a 
takeover announcement.  Linking the findings of these three studies to those of Jaffe 
(1974) and Finnerty (1976), who find that registered insiders possess special information 
that allow them to earn abnormal returns, Keown and Pinkerton conclude that the stock 
price run-ups of target firms preceding takeover announcements are attributable to illegal 
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trading on inside information.  The daily results reported by Keown and Pinkerton are 
later corroborated by Dennis and McConnell (1986) who find abnormal returns beginning 
twenty days before merger announcements. 
Contrary to the insider trading theory, Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) suggest that the 
same pre-bid price run-ups are consistent with capital markets anticipating a takeover bid 
for a target firm. Controlling for media speculation about the potential takeover of the 
target in advance of a formal takeover announcement, Jarrell and Poulsen find that pre-
bid price run-ups are significantly higher in media-speculated bids than in non-speculated 
bids.  The authors conclude that these price run-ups are consistent with “a legitimate 
market for information” in the form of capital market anticipation of a takeover rather 
than trading on inside information. 
Sanders and Zdanowicz (1992) redefine the event period to include an 
unpublicized initiation date that is taken as the first sign of a takeover bid rather than the 
initial date of media speculation.  Similar to Jarrell and Poulsen, the authors conclude that 
the takeover announcement date is not the appropriate benchmark to use for the defining 
date of the event to determine if insider trading exists.  Using an event date adjusted to 
account for unpublicized signals of impending takeovers, Sanders and Zdanowicz find no 
evidence of any volume or price run-up prior to this adjusted date.   
Other studies have found a mix of insider and speculative trading leading up to the 
announcement of a takeover attempt.  In her empirical study of prosecuted insider trades, 
Meulbroek (1992) finds that approximately half of the pre-bid run-up in stock prices 
preceding a takeover announcement is attributable to insider trading and this insider 
trading begins six days prior to takeover announcements, on average.  In clinical studies 
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of the takeover attempts of Campbell Taggart and Carnation, Cornell and Sirri (1992) and 
Chakravarty and McConnell (1999) respectively find that known insider trades in stocks 
are hidden within liquidity and speculative (“noise”) trades and the two types of trades are 
indistinguishable from each other without the knowledge of which trades were actually 
executed on behalf of insiders.  These results support the empirical findings of Jarrell and 
Poulsen and Sanders and Zdanowicz that insider trading is not the sole driving force 
behind pre-bid stock price and volume run-ups, but they also contradict the conclusion 
that the run-ups are solely attributable to market anticipation.  Taken together, these 
studies seem to suggest that the pre-bid run-ups in stock price and volume are driven by 
both types of informed trading – insiders and informed speculators anticipating a takeover 
attempt.  However, these studies do not investigate pre-announcement trading if options 
are available. 
Event studies suggest that informed trading exists in the option market (see 
Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas (1998) for a formal model as to why this may be the case) 
and leads to more efficient price discovery in the underlying stock market.  Amin and Lee 
(1997) show that the existence of traded options leads to more efficient price discovery in 
the event of surprise earnings announcements.  Both Cao, Chen, and Griffin (2000) and 
Jayaraman, Frye, and Sabherwal (2001) find that informed trading in options markets 
leads to more efficient price discovery preceding takeover announcements.  Chakravarty, 
Gulen, and Mayhew (2004) find that option markets contribute approximately 17% to 
price discovery.  Levy and Yoder (1993) also show that implied option volatility reacts 
 5 
 
further in advance of a merger announcement than the stock price.1  Consequently, the 
options market does appear to be a possibly “preferred” venue for trading in advance of 
an informational event.  However, as discussed in Skinner (1997) in regard to earnings 
announcements, it is difficult to separate astute speculators with insider traders.  This 
same shortcoming also applies to merger announcements because such an event does not 
yield a perfect advantage to insiders as the actual takeover premium is not completely 
known upon announcement nor is there a guarantee of fruition.2 
Although an investigation of insider trading is not goal of this paper, the selection 
of cash tender offers as the subject of our analysis is in direct response to this caveat of 
“speculators” versus “insiders” issue of Skinner.  Cash tender offers give an “insider” a 
definite advantage in that the exact takeover premium can be known in advance, but there 
will still be the possibility of the acquisition failing.  Because tender offers are used in 
this study, we expect the option market to become the preferred venue for trading due to 
the informational advantage of insider information.  Astute speculators may still be 
present in both the stock and option markets, but such traders do not have the same 
advantage as an insider in this scenario.  Our investigation indicates that the options 
market does become the preferred venue for trading prior to a tender offer and we suspect 
it is because of the informational advantage enjoyed by insiders.  However, empirical 
evidence to indicate the latter statement conclusively does not exist in this paper. 
 
                                                          
1
 Interestingly, Geppert and Kamerschen (2006) find that post-merger implied stock option volatility is 
significantly greater than the amount predicted by a weighted portfolio combination of the target and 
acquirer. 
2
 Consider the recent example of the announced merger of Hewlett-Packard (HP) and Compaq.  The SEC is 
investigating abnormal volume in Compaq call options in the days before the merger announcement, but the 
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3.     Data and methodology 
3.1 Description of sample 
An initial sample of 401 cash tender offer targets announced between January 1, 
1994 and December 31, 2000 is taken from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) 
database.  We limit our sample to inter-party cash tender offers occurring between 1994 
and 2000 as complete call option volume data is not available from the Wall Street 
Journal prior to 1994.3  We then check Value Line for the existence of traded options for 
the target firms of these tender offers.  The sample of tender offers is then dichotomized 
into subsamples on the basis of the existence of traded options.  The subdivision of the 
data yields 71 targets with traded options and 356 targets without traded options.   
Call option data is then collected from daily Wall Street Journals for the period 
beginning 50 days prior to the tender offer announcement date through the actual 
announcement date (day 0).4  Of the 71 targets with traded options, 8 were excluded 
because they were not primary offers and 18 were excluded because they were not pure 
cash offers, resulting in a final subsample of 45 targets with traded options.  
Approximately 40% of these options are traded on the Chicago Board of Options 
Exchange (CBOE) with the remainder traded on the American, New York, Philadelphia, 
and Pacific exchanges.5 A further description of our sample is provided in Table 1. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
options actually lost value since HP stock was offered in exchange for Compaq shares and HP’s stock (and 
Compaq’s) dropped at announcement due to a negative market reaction. 
3
 Initially, we attempted to use the Berkeley options database for our analysis.  However, the database ends 
in 1995 and contains only those options traded on the Chicago Board of Options Exchange (CBOE).  Using 
this database would have limited our options sample size to 22 observations. 
 
4
 We take the SDC announcement date as day 0 unless the announcement occurs after 4:00 P.M. Eastern 
time in which case we assign the following trading day as day 0. 
 
5
 Options trading ceased on the New York Stock Exchange in 1997. 
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3.2  Methodology 
For both the option and non-option tender offer samples, we measure abnormal 
stock price returns using standard event study methodology proposed by Brown and 
Warner (1985) where equity returns are based on the market model: 
rjt = α + βj rmt + εjt           (1) 
where rjt is the rate of return on firm j’s stock on day t, rmt is the return on the CRSP 
value-weighted market portfolio on day t, and εjt is the error term.  We estimate this 
equation over the period beginning 50 days before the announcement date and ending 
21days before the announcement date.  The estimates of the market model parameters are 
then used to calculate abnormal returns during the event period of relative day –20 
through the announcement date. 
Abnormal trading volume in the stock and options markets is measured for both 
the option and non-option samples, based on the methodology put forth by Ajinkya and 
Jain (1989) and used by Sanders and Zdanowicz (1992).  Because raw trading volume 
data are highly non-normal, it is recommended that the volume variable be transformed 
when performing event studies: 
vjt = log(1+volumejt)     (2) 
where volumejt is firm j’s day t trading volume in number of contracts.  We then estimate 
the relation: 
∆vjt = α + βj∆vjt-1 + εjt     (3) 
where ∆vjt = vjt - vjt-1, over the estimation interval –50 through –21.  To calculate 
abnormal volume, we use standard event-study methodology and re-estimate this 
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equation during the event period –20 through the announcement date using the 
parameters estimated over the estimation interval where: 
  AVj,t = ∆Vj,t – αj + βj * ∆Vj,t-1    (4) 
and AVj,t is the abnormal volume for the trading day and is summed to calculate a 
cumulative abnormal volume (CAV) through that trading day.  This methodology is 
applied to stocks and aggregate option volume. 
 
 4. Empirical tests for a substitution effect 
In order to determine if a substitution of option trading for stock trading occurs in 
our sample, we compare the volume run-ups in the stocks of both subsamples and the 
aggregate option volume of the subsample with traded options to determine if a 
significant difference exists in the abnormal volume patterns between the two 
subsamples.  If we find significant abnormal aggregate option volume in the traded option 
subsample, along with a corresponding lower level of abnormal stock volume for the 
option subsample relative to the non-option subsample, then we may conclude that a 
substitution effect exists. 
 
4.1 Volume and price run-ups in target stocks  
We present our results for the abnormal stock price returns for the full, option, and 
non-option samples over the 21-day event period, beginning 20 days prior to the tender 
offer announcement date and ending on the announcement date, in Table 2.  For the 
subsample of targets with listed options we find significant CARs of 33.97% over the 21-
day event period with continuously significant CARs beginning on day –13.  Targets 
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without listed options experience CARs of 27.23% over this 21-day interval and these 
CARs become continuously significant on day -5.  Our abnormal volume results also 
reveal a difference in run-up patterns between the option and non-option subsamples.  As 
can be seen in Table 3, the subsample of targets without traded options experiences 
significant CAV on day -10.  In contrast, the CAV of targets with traded options does not 
become continuously significant until three days before announcement.6  This seven day 
lag in cumulative abnormal stock volume demonstrates that abnormal stock volume is 
greater for tender offer targets without traded options – despite the fact that the CARs of 
tender offer targets with traded options become significant eight days in advance of those 
stocks without traded options.  This result confirms the finding of Cao, Chen, and Griffin 
(2000) and Jayaraman, Frye, and Sabherwal (2001) that the existence of traded options 
leads to more efficient price discovery.  To further determine if trading volume has 
migrated from the stock market to the options market for tender offer targets with traded 
options we examine abnormal trading volume in the options market. 
 
4.2  Analysis of aggregate call option volume  
To measure abnormal aggregate call option volume (AACOV) we employ the 
Sanders and Zdanowicz measure described in Section 3.  Consistent with Jayaraman, 
Frye, and Saberwahl (2001), our results show that abnormal call option volume occurs 
well in advance of abnormal stock volume for targets with traded options.  As can be seen 
in Table 4, significant cumulative abnormal volume begins 13 days prior to 
announcement – one day before stock CARs and 10 days before stock CAVs become 
                                                          
6
 After controlling for media speculation, stock CAV becomes significant on day –1 in the options sample 
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significant in the same subsample, and three days before CAVs become significant in the 
non-options subsample.  Our nonparametric binomial test statistic reveals that 
significantly more than 50% of the targets with traded options experience aggregate call 
option volume in excess of their median control-period level beginning on day –6 and 
extending through the announcement day.  These results are similar to those of Levy and 
Yoder who find the implied standard deviations of options contracts increase significantly 
three days prior to takeover announcements. 
Overall, our results indicate that abnormal volume begins earlier in the options 
market than in the stock market and that the abnormal stock volume that exists for the 
subsample without traded options is largely replaced by abnormal option volume for 
those stocks with traded options.  These results support the assertion of Easley, O’Hara, 
and Srinivas that informed traders will substitute trading in options for trading in stocks 
when possible.  
 
5. Summary and conclusions 
In this study, we present evidence that a substitution effect exists that favors the 
purchase of option contracts over the underlying securities preceding tender offer 
announcements.  Comparing the run-up patterns in stock price and volume between 
tender offer targets with and without traded options, we find that significant abnormal 
stock volumes preceding the announcement occur much sooner for those targets without 
traded options.  For those targets with traded options, we find that the abnormal stock 
volume that exists for stocks without traded options is replaced by abnormal options 
                                                                                                                                                                             
and day –8 in the nonoptions sample. 
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volume.  Further, the abnormal volume begins earlier in the options market for target 
stocks with options than in the stock market for targets with or without traded options. 
 1 
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Table 1 
Description of sample 
Description of sample data including number of tender offer target and option contract observations, and breakdown of exchanges on which options were traded 
in Panel A.  Descriptive statistics of stock and option returns and number of contracts per tender offer target with traded options over the event period are reported 
in Panel B. 
 
Panel A: General description of sample 
 
Sample characteristics        Options exchanges of tender offer targets 
Tender offer targets with traded options    45    Chicago Board of Options Exchange 19 
Tender offer targets without traded options  352    Philadelphia    11 
Number of options contracts analyzed  545    American      7 
          Pacific       5 
          New York      3 
 
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of securities and their returns in sample 
 
  
Mean 
 
Median 
Standard 
deviation 
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
Event period tender offer target common stock return 34% 31% 26% 1% 140% 
Average event period tender offer target call option return for all traded options of target 417% 191% 731% 5% 4,348% 
Event period tender offer target insider contract return 1,233% 371% 3,127% 7% 20,800% 
Number of call option contracts per tender offer target 12.1 10.0 6.1 3 24 
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Table 2 
Abnormal stock returns 
Summary of abnormal stock returns (ARs) and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) from 20 days prior to announcement day through the announcement of tender 
offer during sample period of 1994-2000.  The results are reported for firms with traded options (n=45) and a control sample of firms without traded options 
(n=356). 
 
 Option Sample Non-Option Sample 
Day AR z-stat CAR t-stat AR z-stat CAR t-stat 
-20 0.22 0.45 0.22 0.45 0.24 0.85 0.24 0.85 
-19 -0.10 -0.22 0.11 0.15 -0.06 -0.30 0.18 0.55 
-18 0.94 a 2.74 1.06 1.30 -0.25 -1.09 -0.05 -0.13 
-17 0.48 1.21 1.54 b 2.01 -0.14 -0.58 -0.19 -0.41 
-16 0.16 0.38 1.69 b 1.87 -0.11 -0.49 -0.30 -0.58 
-15 -0.59 -1.57 1.11 1.13 0.34 1.33 0.05 0.08 
-14 0.04 0.07 1.15 1.02 0.15 0.64 0.20 0.32 
-13 1.00 b 1.74 2.14 1.52 0.17 0.83 0.36 0.55 
-12 0.93 1.10 3.07 a 2.09 -0.29 -1.31 0.08 0.11 
-11 0.28 0.52 3.34 a 2.18 0.00 -0.01 0.08 0.12 
-10 0.67 1.42 4.01 a 2.38 0.16 0.69 0.24 0.33 
-9 0.42 0.94 4.44 a 2.61 0.01 0.03 0.24 0.33 
-8 0.47 1.01 4.91 a 2.74 0.02 0.08 0.27 0.35 
-7 -0.41 -0.87 4.50 a 2.48 0.19 0.85 0.46 0.58 
-6 1.62 b 2.34 6.12 a 3.17 0.53 a 2.25 0.99 b 1.22 
-5 0.47 0.96 6.60 a 3.31 0.43 b 1.73 1.42 b 1.69 
-4 0.15 0.38 6.75 a 3.31 0.45 b 1.77 1.87 b 2.12 
-3 1.43 1.56 8.18 a 3.72 1.32 a 4.13 3.20 a 3.38 
-2 0.34 0.60 8.52 a 4.14 0.98 a 3.57 4.18 a 4.21 
-1 4.88 a 3.03 13.40 a 5.27 1.96 a 5.52 6.13 a 5.99 
0 20.57 a 6.26 33.97 a 10.35 21.09 a 16.92 27.23 a 17.99 
 
 
a     Significant at the 1% level. 
b     Significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 3 
Abnormal stock volume 
Summary of abnormal stock volume (AV) and cumulative abnormal volume (CAV) from 20 days prior to announcement day through the announcement of tender 
offer during sample period of 1994-2000.  The results are reported for firms with traded options (n=45) and a control sample of firms without traded options 
(n=356). 
 
 Option Sample Non-Option Sample 
Day AV z-stat CAV t-stat AV z-stat CAV t-stat 
-20 0.15 1.34 0.15 1.34 -0.02 -0.28 -0.02 -0.28 
-19 -0.10 -0.76 0.05 0.25 0.05 0.85 0.04 0.54 
-18 -0.14 -0.94 -0.09 -0.50 0.01 0.21 0.05 0.73 
-17 0.24 1.42 0.15 0.65 0.01 0.10 0.06 0.81 
-16 -0.21 -1.45 -0.06 -0.28 -0.15 b -2.31 -0.08 -1.16 
-15 0.01 0.02 -0.05 -0.24 0.21 a 3.59 0.13 b 1.98 
-14 0.02 0.17 -0.03 -0.13 -0.02 -0.31 0.11 1.62 
-13 0.30 b 1.91 0.28 1.04 0.03 0.46 0.14 b 2.04 
-12 0.03 0.14 0.31 0.92 0.01 0.17 0.15 b 2.09 
-11 0.04 0.26 0.35 1.05 -0.06 -1.06 0.09 1.37 
-10 0.08 0.53 0.43 1.30 0.13 b 2.30 0.22 a 3.18 
-9 -0.21 -1.15 0.22 0.68 -0.06 -0.95 0.16 b 2.33 
-8 -0.09 -0.78 0.13 0.36 0.00 -0.07 0.15 b 2.11 
-7 0.13 0.66 0.26 0.68 0.01 0.22 0.18 b 2.41 
-6 0.19 0.90 0.45 1.24 0.13 b 2.20 0.31 a 4.36 
-5 0.20 1.36 0.66 b 1.75 0.02 0.30 0.33 s 4.48 
-4 -0.11 -0.90 0.55 1.48 0.09 1.55 0.42 a 5.49 
-3 0.42 b 2.57 0.97 b 2.51 0.11 b 1.91 0.53 a 7.29 
-2 -0.18 -1.17 0.79 b 2.14 0.09 1.59 0.62 a 8.05 
-1 0.40 b 1.95 1.18 a 3.17 0.23 a 3.83 0.85 a 10.29 
0 2.73 a 10.73 3.89 a 10.11 2.16 a 23.62 3.01 a 29.82 
 
 
 
 
a     Significant at the 1% level. 
b     Significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 4 
Aggregate call option volume surrounding tender offer announcement 
Summary of call option volume over the event period of relative day –20 through the announcement day (day 0) for our sample of 45 tender offer targets with traded 
options.  Relative day information shown in this table includes aggregate call option abnormal volume, percent of tender offer targets with aggregate volume above 
control period median values, binomial test statistic for proportions, and aggregate call option cumulative abnormal volume. 
 
 
 
Day 
 
Abnormal aggregate call option volume 
% at or above 
control period median 
volume 
 
Binomial 
test statistic 
Cumulative 
abnormal aggregate call 
option volume 
-20   0.00 40 -1.26 0.00 
-19   0.16 40 -1.26 0.16 
-18 -0.05 43 -0.94 0.11 
-17   0.37 40 -1.26 0.47 
-16     0.72 b 48 -0.31 1.19 
-15 -0.30 43 -0.94 0.89 
-14   0.01 43 -0.94 0.90 
-13   0.31 50 0.00 1.21 b 
-12   0.25 50 0.00 1.46 a 
-11   0.45 55 0.62 1.91 a 
-10   0.37 52 0.31 2.28 a 
-9   0.15 52 0.31 2.43 a 
-8   0.12 52 0.31 2.53 a 
-7   0.09 55 0.62 2.62 a 
-6     0.89 a 71 3.07 a 3.50 a 
-5  0.04 71 3.07 a 3.55 a 
-4     0.89 b 71 3.07 a 4.44 a 
-3     0.74 b 79 4.51 a 5.18 a 
-2   0.20 74 3.51 a 5.38 a 
-1     0.86 a 93 10.78 a 6.25 a 
0     1.65 a 95 13.77 a 7.89 a 
 
a Significant at the 1% level 
b Significant at the 10% level 
 
